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ABSTRACT
Deep Learning (DL) systems are key enablers for engineering intel-
ligent applications due to their ability to solve complex tasks such
as image recognition and machine translation. Nevertheless, using
DL systems in safety- and security-critical applications requires
to provide testing evidence for their dependable operation. Recent
research in this direction focuses on adapting testing criteria from
traditional software engineering as a means of increasing confi-
dence for their correct behaviour. However, they are inadequate
in capturing the intrinsic properties exhibited by these systems.
We bridge this gap by introducing DeepImportance, a systematic
testing methodology accompanied by an Importance-Driven (IDC)
test adequacy criterion for DL systems. Applying IDC enables to
establish a layer-wise functional understanding of the importance
of DL system components and use this information to assess the
semantic diversity of a test set. Our empirical evaluation on several
DL systems, across multiple DL datasets and with state-of-the-art
adversarial generation techniques demonstrates the usefulness and
effectiveness of DeepImportance and its ability to support the engi-
neering of more robust DL systems.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Driven by the increasing availability of publicly-accessible data
and massive parallel processing power, Deep Learning (DL) sys-
tems have achieved unprecedented progress, commensurate with
the cognitive abilities of humans [28, 46]. In fact, DL systems can
solve challenging real-world tasks such as image classification [22],
natural language processing [70] and speech recognition [34]. Con-
sequently, DL systems are becoming key enablers in many appli-
cations, including medical diagnostics [47], air traffic control [39],
malicious code detection [23] and autonomous vehicles [13].
Despite the manifold potential applications, using DL systems in
safety- and security-critical applications requires the provision of
assurance evidence for their trustworthy and robust behaviour [15].
Vulnerabilities and defects in these systems, either originating from
systematic errors, insufficient generalisation or inadequate training,
can endanger human lives, lead to environmental damage or cause
significant financial loss [72]. Preliminary reports from safety advi-
sory boards (e.g., the US transportation board [4]) regarding recent
unfortunate events involving autonomous vehicles [3, 5] underline
not only the challenges associated with using DL systems but also
the urgent need for improved assurance evaluation practices.
From a safety assurance perspective, testing has been among
the primary instruments for evaluating quality properties of soft-
ware systems providing a trade off between completeness and effi-
ciency [38]. Domain-specific standards such as ISO26262 [25] and
DO-178C [62] prescribe testing principles (e.g., adequacy criteria,
testing properties) which should be employed for the verification
of applications within the automotive and avionics domains, re-
spectively. Evidence collected as a result of testing is typically used
to demonstrate compliance with expected quality assurance levels,
thus manifesting the ability of those systems to operate with an
acceptable risk of failure within their lifetime.
However, testing DL systems by simply adopting principles rec-
ommended by these standards is not straightforward [14, 67]. The
lack of a system specification regulating the inference mechanism
to be learnt combined with the data-driven programming paradigm
makes impossible to explicitly encode the expected DL system be-
haviour into its control flow structures [64]. The extremely large
configuration spaces of modern DL models deteriorates the issue
as it is impossible to determine and calibrate the influence of each
configurable parameter in completing a task; e.g., LeNet [45] and
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VGG-16 [66] have more than 60K and 100M configurable parame-
ters, respectively. Thus, traditional software testing techniques and
coverage criteria [7] are inapplicable for DL system verification.
Driven by the need for providing high-quality assurance in
DL systems and inspired by traditional software engineering test-
ing paradigms [7], recent research proposes novel testing tech-
niques and coverage criteria [43, 50, 55, 58, 69] (see Section 6 for
an overview of related work). The core principle underlying those
techniques is that for effective DL system testing, the test set should
be characterised by high diversity, thus enabling to exercise differ-
ent behaviours of the system [50]. For example, DeepXplore [58]
estimates the diverse DL system behaviour by calculating neuron
coverage as the ratio of neurons whose activation values are above
a predefined threshold. Similarly, the DeepGauge multi-granularity
testing criteria [50] generalise the neuron coverage concept and
calculate the ability of the test set to cover (i.e., trigger) major and
corner-case neuron regions, given by partitioning the ranges of
neuron activation values. Despite their usefulness, these criteria
are simply an aggregation of neurons (or neuron regions) whose
activation values conform to certain conditions. By focusing only
on these constrained neuron properties and ignoring the overall
DL system behaviour, the causal relationship between the test set
and decision-making is uninformative [43]. Also, the instantiation
of recently proposed techniques depends on user-defined condi-
tions (number of regions [50] or upper bounds [43]) which might
not represent the actual behaviour of the DL system adequately.
Finally, these criteria provide limited information about the testing
improvement contributed by individual test inputs as expected for
an effective testing adequacy criterion [7, 27].
In this paper, we bridge the gap in existing research by introduc-
ingDeepImportance, a systematic testingmethodology accompanied
by an Importance-Driven test adequacy criterion for DL systems
based on relevance propagation. By analysing the activity of a
DL system and its internal neuron behaviours, DeepImportance
develops a layer-wise functional understanding that signifies the
contribution of internal neurons to the output through the layers.
This contribution enables to determine the causal relationship be-
tween the neurons and the DL system behaviour as more influential
neurons have a stronger causal relationship and can explain which
high-level features influencemore the decision-making. DeepImpor-
tance establishes this relationship by computing a decomposition of
the decision made by the DL system and iteratively redistributing
the relevance in a layer-wise manner proportional to how promi-
nent each neuron and its connections are [11]. As we demonstrate
in Section 3.1, this importance score is quite different from the
neuron activation values used by similar DL testing techniques
(e.g., [50, 58]). Using those important neurons, DeepImportance
carries out neuron-wise quantisation to partition the space of each
neuron’s activity into an automatically-determined finite set of
clusters that captures its behaviour to a sufficient level of granu-
larity. The Importance-Driven adequacy criterion instrumented by
DeepImportance measures the adequacy of an input set as the ratio
of combinations of important neurons clusters covered by the set.
Our empirical evaluation using publicly available datasets (MNIST
[45], CIFAR-10 [1], Udacity self-driving challenge [2]) and DL sys-
tems whose models size ranges from small-medium (LeNet [45])
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Figure 1: A four layer fully-connected DL system that re-
ceives inputs fromvehicle sensors (camera, LiDAR, infrared)
and outputs a decision for speed, steering angle and brake.
to large (e.g., Dave-2 [13]) demonstrates the ability of DeepIm-
portance to develop a functional understanding of the DL system
and evaluate the testing adequacy of a test set. Furthermore, the
Importance-Driven adequacy criterion is effective in quantifying
the ability of a DL system to identify defects as indicated by the
coverage difference between the original test set and adversarial
examples generated using state-of-the-art adversarial generation
techniques [19, 29, 44, 57].
Overall, the main contributions of our paper are:
• The DeepImportance approach for finding important neurons
of a DL system that are core contributors in decision-making;
• The Importance-Driven Coverage criterion which can establish
the adequacy of an input set to trigger different combinations
of important neurons’ behaviours, thus enabling software engi-
neers to assess the semantic adequacy of a test set;
• AmextensiveDeepImportance evaluation on three public datasets
(MNIST, CIFAR-10, Udacity) and threeDL systems (LeNet, CIFAR-
10, Dave-2) showing its feasibility and effectiveness;
• A prototype open-source DeepImportance tool and a repository
of case studies, both of which are freely available from our
project webpage at https://deepimportance.github.io.
To the best of our knowledge, DeepImportance is the first system-
atic and automated testingmethodology that employs the semantics
of neuron influence to the DL system as a means of developing a
laywer-wise functional understanding of its internal behaviour and
assessing the semantic adequacy of a test set.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
presents briefly DL systems and coverage criteria in traditional soft-
ware testing. Section 3 introduces DeepImportance and Section 4
presents its open-source implementation. Section 5 describes the
experimental setup and evaluation carried out. Sections 6 and 7
discuss related work and conclude the paper, respectively.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Deep Learning Systems
Fig. 1 shows a typical feed-forward DL system consisting of several
interconnected neurons arranged into consecutive layers: the input
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Figure 2: DeepImportance workflow for determining the importance-based testing adequacy of a DL system.
layer, the output layer and at least one hidden layer [28]. Each layer
within a DL system comprises a sequence of neurons. A neuron
represents a computing unit that applies a nonlinear activation
function to its inputs and transmits the result to neurons in the
following layer [46]. Commonly used activation functions include
sigmoid, hyperbolic tangent and ReLU (Rectified Linear Unit). All
neurons, except from those in the input layer, are connected to
neurons in the following layer with weights whose values express
how strong are the connections among neuron pairs. A DL system’s
architecture comprises the number of layers, neurons per layer,
neuron activation functions and a cost function. Given such an
architecture, the DL system carries out an iterative training process
through which it consumes labelled input data (e.g, raw image
pixels) in its input layer, executes a set of nonlinear transformations
in its hidden layers to extract semantic concepts (i.e., features) from
the input data, and, finally, generates a decision that matches the
effect of these computations in its output layer. The training process
aims at finding weight values that minimize the cost function, thus
enabling the DL system to achieve high generalisability.
2.2 Coverage Criteria in Software Testing
Since testing a software system exhaustively is, in principle, impos-
sible due to its extremely large number of possible inputs, coverage
criteria are typically employed to quantify howwell a test suite exer-
cises the system [7, 59]. There are several types of coverage criteria,
with the most widely-adopted in industry being: statement cover-
age, condition coverage, path coverage and branch coverage [38].
Testing techniques and coverage criteria are building blocks of
safety standards employed in various safety-critical domains such
as automotive and avionics (e.g., ISO26262 [25], DO-178C [62]). De-
pending on the integrity level associated with a system component,
different coverage criteria are mandated. For instance, ISO26262
requires to demonstrate compliance with statement coverage and
MC/DC (Modified Condition/Decision coverage) for components
whose integrity levels are the lowest (A) and highest (D), respec-
tively. The higher the risk from a component’s misbehaviour, the
higher its integrity level, and thus, more significant assurance (test-
ing) effort is required to avoid unreasonable residual risk.
3 APPROACH
DeepImportance, whose high-level workflow is shown in Fig. 2,
enables the systematic testing and evaluation of DL systems. Using
a pre-trained DL system, DeepImportance analyses the training set
T to establish a fundamental understanding of the overall contri-
bution made by internal neurons of the DL system. This enables to
identify the most important neurons that are core contributors to
the decision-making process (Section 3.1). Then, DeepImportance
carries out a quantisation step which produces an automatically-
determined finite set of clusters of neuron activation values that
characterises, to a sufficient level, how the behaviour of the most
important neurons changes with respect to inputs from the train-
ing set (Section 3.2). Finally, DeepImportance uses the produced
clusters of the most important neurons to assess the coverage ade-
quacy of the test set (Section 3.3). Informally, the Importance-Driven
test adequacy criterion of DeepImportance is satisfied when all
combinations of important neurons clusters are exercised.
We use the following notations to present DeepImportance. Let
D be a DL system with L layers. Each layer Li , 1 ≤ i ≤ L, comprises
|Li | neurons and the total number of neurons in D is S = ∑Li=1 |Li |.
Let also ni, j be the j-th neuron in the i-th layer. When the context
is clear, we use n ∈ D to denote any neuron that is a member of D
irrespective of its layer. Let X denote the input domain of D and
x ∈ X be a concrete input. Finally, we use the function ϕ(x ,n) ∈ R
to signify the output of the activation function of neuron n ∈ D.
3.1 Neuron Importance Analysis
The purpose of importance analysis is to identify neurons within a
DL system that are key contributors to decision-making. Given an
input, information within a DL system is propagated according to
the strength of connections (weights) between neurons in succes-
sive layers. As such, the activity of some neurons influences more
the capabilities of the system to make correct decisions [46].
Although representation learning is a key characteristic of DL sys-
tems that eliminates the tedious and potentially erroneous process
of manual feature extraction, it also means that neurons develop,
through backpropagation [63], the ability to learn optimal feature
transformations for the given setting on their own [12]. More specif-
ically, raw input data passing through the complex architecture of a
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Algorithm 1 Neuron importance analysis
1: function ImportantNeuronsAnalysis(D, X,m)
2: R ← ∅ ▷ relevant neurons vector
3: for all x ∈ X do
4: Rx ← ∅ ▷ x ∈ X importance vector
5: RL = ComputeValue(D, x ) ▷ decision value
6: for all i ∈ {LL−1, ..., L1 } do ▷ relevance propagation
7: RL=Relevance(Li , x, RL ) ▷ Li neurons relevance
8: Rx = Rx ⌢ RL ▷ append to vector Rx
9: R = R ∪ Rx ▷ collect relevance vectors
10: AN = Analyse(D, R) ▷ analyse relevance vectors
11: return Top(AN ,m) ▷ select topm neurons
modern DL system, with many layers, many neurons per layer and
non-linear transformations (e.g., ReLU activation functions [52],
max pooling, convolutions), yield abstract and discriminative fea-
tures that enable the system to make effective decisions in the final
layer using a log-linear model (typically softmax) [46]. For instance,
neurons within the initial hidden layers learn abstract shapes (e.g.,
edges, circles) while neurons in deeper layers extract more semanti-
cally meaningful features (e.g., faces, objects). Using as an analogy a
software system whose architecture adopts conventional software
engineering principles, neurons can be considered as functions that
execute a distinct functionality. Irrespective of the position of a
function into the control flow graph, it receives (transformed) in-
formation from functions preceding in the graph and itself applies
function-specific transformations before propagating the updated
information to subsequent functions in the control flow graph.
We capitalise on this unique characteristic of neurons within
a trained DL system to establish the importance of each neuron.
To achieve this, we compute a decomposition of the decision f (x)
made by the system for input x ∈ X and use layer-wise relevance
propagation [11] to traverse the network graph and redistribute the
decision value in a layer-wise manner proportional to the contribu-
tion made by each neuron within the layer. For a fully-connected
layer i , the relevance Ri j of the j-th neuron entails redistributing
relevance from neurons in layer i + 1 which is given by [11]:
Ri j =
∑
k
ϕ(x ,ni j )wi jk∑
i ϕ(x ,ni j )wi jk + ϵ
Ri+1,k (1)
where Ri+1,k is the relevance score of the k-the neuron in layer
i + 1,wi jk is the weight connecting neuron j to neuron k and ϵ is a
small stabilization term (to avoid division by zero).
Intuitively, the relevance attributed to neurons in layer i from
neurons in layer i + 1 is proportional to (i) the neuron activation
ϕ(x ,ni j ), i.e., neurons with higher activation values receive a larger
relevance contribution; and (ii) the strength of the connectionwi jk ,
i.e., more relevance flows through more important connections.
While (1) applies to fully-connected layers, we refer interested
readers to [54] for definitions of redistribution rules for other layer
types including pooling, activation and normalisation layers.
The redistribution process is underpinned by a relevance con-
servation property specifying that at every step of the process (i.e.,
Figure 3: Input from MNIST dataset with the most impor-
tant pixels contributing to the correct decision highlighted
(left), and difference between neuron activation values and
relevance scores (right) for the same set of neurons.
at every layer Li ) the total amount of relevance (i.e., the predic-
tion) is conserved. No relevance is artificially added or removed.1.
Therefore,
∑ |L1 |
j R1j = · · · =
∑ |L4 |
k R4k =
∑ |L5 |
l R5l = · · · = f (x).
Algorithm 1 shows the high-level process for computing the
importance scores for neurons of D and selecting them most im-
portant. For any given input x ∈ X , we perform a standard forward
pass to compute the decision value, i.e., the magnitude of evidence
for a given class before applying softmax (line 5). Next, we perform
a backward pass (lines 6–8) considering each layer successively
during which the relevance is allocated to neurons of the current
layer before being backpropagated from one layer to another until
it reaches the input layer. The decomposition is achieved using the
layer-specific rules in [11]. The Analyse function (line 10) analyses
the relevance scores of all neurons for all inputs and prioritises
them based on a priority criterion (e.g., cumulative relevance, nor-
malised relevance). In our evaluation (Section 5), we use cumulative
relevance. Finally, the topm neurons are returned (line 11).
The use of relevance for identifying the most important neurons
is a key ingredient of our approach. Building on recent research
on explainability of DL systems, which targets the identification of
input parts responsible for a prediction, DeepImportance targets
the identification of the most influential neurons; these are high-
risk neurons that should be tested thoroughly. Albeit being outside
the scope of this work, we also highlight that other explainability-
driven techniques could be used for the identification of the most
important neurons (e.g., DeepLift [65], L2X [20]).
State-of-the-art testing adequacy criteria for DL systems includ-
ing neuron coverage [58] and k-multisection neuron coverage [50]
quantify testing coverage solely based on neuron values, irrespec-
tive of the added value of a neuron to the final decision. In other
words, a neuron might contribute to increasing the confidence for
classes other than the correct one, and this is not distinguished.
DeepImportance captures the actual contribution made by each
neuron to the decision which in shallow and deeper layers corre-
sponds to raw pixels and concrete features from the input domain,
respectively. For instance, Fig. 3 (left) shows the most important
pixels and Fig. 3 (right) shows the difference between the activation
values and the relevance scores for the same set of most impor-
tant neurons within the penultimate layer of a LeNet network [45].
DeepImportance exploits this understanding to assess the adequacy
1When neurons with bias contribute to the output, the relevance attribution to the
bias is redistributed onto each input of the decomposed layer using the method in [54].
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of a test set to examine the most critical neurons, i.e., those with
the strongest influence on the behaviour of the DL system.
Using relevance is also significantly different compared to sen-
sitivity analysis [54]. While sensitivity analysis cares about what
makes more/less a labelled input (e.g., a dog) to be classified as its
target label, relevance analysis investigates what actually makes
the input to be classified as that label. The sensitivity scores do not
really explain why an input has been predicted in a certain way, but
rather to which direction in the input space the output is most sen-
sitive. In contrast, relevance scores indicate which neurons/inputs
are pivotal for the classification. Thus, they are a significantly more
informative and practicable measure for assessing and explaining
the composition about the decision made by the DL systems [11].
3.2 Important Neurons Clustering
Having established the important neurons that are core contributors
to the behaviour of the DL system, we are now ready to determine
regions within their value domain which are central to the DL
system execution. Since each neuron is responsible for perceiving
specific features within the input domain [46], we argue that for
inputs with similar features the activation values of those important
neurons are concentrated into specific regions within their value
domain. Informally, those regions form a pattern that captures the
activity of the most influential neurons of the DL system.
The purpose of clustering is threefold. First, compared to [50]
which partitions the value range of neuron activation values into k
buckets of equal width solely based on a randomly selected number
of buckets (i.e., k-multisection neuron coverage [50]), the clusters
generated by our approach correspond to semantically different fea-
tures of each neuron. Second, since the range of neuron activation
values ϕ(x ,n) could in principle be the entire set of real numbers
(R+ for ReLU activation functions), the cyclomatic complexity for
analysing the DL system is very large. Similar to techniques em-
ployed in [43, 50], clustering (bucketing in [43, 50]) enables to re-
duce dimensionality and computational cost, thus making tractable
to test the DL system (cf. Section 5). Finally, the identification of
clusters for those important neurons could inform the allocation of
testing resources to ensure that the regions of those neurons are
tested sufficiently, thus increasing our confidence for the robust DL
system behaviour.
DeepImportance employs iterative unsupervised learning to clus-
ter the vector of activation values from the training set for each
important neuron and determine sets of values that can be grouped
together. The DeepImportance instantiation we present in this
research work (Section 5) employs k-means [33], an iterative clus-
tering method that produces k clusters which minimize the within-
class sum of squares. To this end, we segment the activation values
of each important neuron into groups (clusters) so that activation
values within the same group are more similar to other activation
values in the same group and dissimilar to those in other groups.
Determining the optimal number of clusters without analysing
the data is not a trivial problem [41]. We reinforce cluster extrac-
tion with the Silhouette index [61], thus supporting the automatic
identification of a neuron-specific optimal strategy for clustering
the activation values of each important neuron in Dm . Silhouette
Algorithm 2 Important Neurons Cluster Extraction
1: function ClusterImportantNeurons(Dm, T, C)
2: Ψ← ∅ ▷ vector for clustered important neurons
3: for all n ∈ Dm do
4: Φn = (ϕ(t, n)), t ∈ T ▷ n-th neuron activation values
5: cmaxn = arg maxc∈C Score(Φn, Labels(Φn, c))
6: Ψn = Cluster(Φn, cmaxn ) ▷ Ψn =
⋃
1≤i≤cmaxn Ψ
i
n
7: Ψ = Ψ ∪ Ψn ▷ collect cluster vectors
8: return Ψ
is an internal clustering validation index that computes the good-
ness of a clustering structure without external information [48]. As
such, depending on each neuron’s activation values, the optimal
number of clusters is determined automatically and can be different
between the important neurons. Also, this strategy addresses the
weakness of k-means that requires to define the desired number of
clusters a priori. More formally, given the n-th important neuron,
n ∈ Dm , and the function C(t) indicating for each t ∈ T the cluster
assigned to ϕ(t ,n) within the n-th neuron’s clusters, the Silhouette
score for c ∈ N+ clusters is defined as follows
Scn =
1
|T |
|T |∑
t=1
B(t) −A(t)
max(B(t),A(t)) (2)
where
A(t) = 11 − |C(t)|
∑
ϕ(u,n)∈{C(t )\ϕ(t,n)}
d(ϕ(u,n),ϕ(t ,n)) (3)
is the intra-cluster cohesion given by the average L1 distance of
activation value ϕ(t ,n) to all other values in the same cluster, and
B(t) = min
C ′,C(t )
1
|C ′ |
∑
ϕ(u,n)∈C ′
d(ϕ(u,n),ϕ(t ,n)) (4)
is the inter-cluster separation given by the average L1 distance be-
tween ϕ(t ,n) and activation values in its nearest neighbour cluster.
Maximising the Silhouette score gives the optimal clustering
strategy and correspondingly the optimal number of clusters for
the n-th important neuron. Therefore, the higher the score the
better the overall quality of the clustering result in terms of cluster
cohesion and cluster separation.
Algorithm 2 shows the high-level process underpinning Deep-
Importance for quantising the vector of neuron activation values
and extracting clusters for the most important neurons. Given as
inputs the training set T ⊆ X, the set of possible clusters C ⊂ N+
and the set of important neurons Dm (cf. Section 3.1), DeepImpor-
tance produces for each neuron n ∈ Dm the vector of activation
values Φn for all training inputs t ∈ T (line 4). Then, through an
iterative cluster analysis strategy using the Silhouette index [61],
we find the optimal clustering strategy for each important neuron’s
activation values (line 5). Next, we establish the clusters such that
Ψn =
⋃
1≤i≤cmaxn Ψ
i
n , where Ψin is the vector containing the activa-
tion values for th i-th cluster (line 6). We stop when all important
neurons have been analysed.
Our approach is generic and can support different clustering
algorithms, including density-based, grid-based and hierarchical
clustering [41]. We emphasise, however, the importance of using an
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iterative strategy that enables to determine the optimum number
of clusters. This is an important step that defines the granularity
of our importance-driven test adequacy criterion (cf. Section 3.3).
Investigating the applicability and effectiveness of other clustering
algorithms and clustering validity criteria is left for future work.
3.3 Importance-Driven Coverage
Given an input set Y , we can measure the degree to which it cov-
ers the clusters of important neurons, termed Importance-Driven
Coverage (IDC). Since important neurons are core contributors in
decision-making (cf. Section 3.1), it is significant to establish that
inputs triggering combinations of activation value clusters of those
neurons (cf. Section 3.2) have been covered adequately. Doing this,
enables to test the most influential neurons, thus increasing our
confidence in the correct operation of the DL system and reduc-
ing the risk for wrong decisions. The vector of important neurons
cluster combinations (INCC) is given by
INCC =
∏
n∈Dm
{Centroid(Ψin )|∀1 ≤ i ≤ |Ψn |} (5)
where the function Centroid(Ψin ) measures the “centre of mass”
of the i-th cluster for the n-th important neuron.
We define Importance-Driven Coverage to be the ratio of INCC
covered by all y ∈ Y over the size of the INCC set. Compared to
all other elements in INCC, the j-th INNC element is covered if
there exists an input y for which the Euclidean distance between
the activation values of all important neurons n ∈ Dm and the cor-
responding neuron’s clusters centroids in j is minimised. Formally
IDC(Y ) = |{INCC(j)|∃y ∈ Y : ∀V
i
n ∈ INCC(j) •mind(ϕ(y,n),V in }|
|INCC |
(6)
Following from (6), a test input is alwaysmapped to an element of
the semantic feature set given by INCC (5). IDC increases only if the
mapped INCC element tests a new semantic feature set not already
covered by existing test suite inputs; otherwise, the score remains
the same. We provide a proof of IDC soundness on DeepImportance
webpage (https://deepimportance.github.io).
Achieving a high IDC score entails a systematically diverse in-
put set that exercises many combinations of important neurons
clusters. The covered combinations do not include only those ex-
ercised during training, whose activation values have been used
for establishing the important neurons, but also new and diverse
combinations. These new combinations could represent edge-case
behaviours for the DL system. The higher the IDC score, the more
INCC combinations have been triggered. Consequently, the more
confidence we should have in the DL system’s operation.
Another important characteristic of IDC is the layer-wise esti-
mation of coverage. By exploiting the combinations of important
neurons clusters given by (5), IDC measures how well multiple
inputs with semantically different features can trigger those combi-
nations. As such, IDC is significantly different to research which
focuses on counting how many neurons have at least once been
the most active neurons on a given layer [50, 58].
The granularity with which IDC is specified depends on the
number of important neuronsm (cf. Algorithm 1). Clearly, setting
m to the number of neurons within any layer results in an un-
manageable INCC number. For instance, assuming each of the 84
neurons of the penultimate layer of LeNet-5 [45] produces two
clusters (cf. Algorithm 6), the number of combinations given by
(5) is INCC = 1.9E+25. Sincem is the only IDC hyper-parameter,
that affects the combinations of important neurons clusters (5), it
enables software engineers to experiment with different testing
strategies by specifying how coarse- or fine-grained the analysis
should be. In safety-critical systems, for instance, we might opt
for a fine-grained IDC coverage, hence a largem, aiming to cover
as many combinations as possible. We show in our experimental
evaluation that the higher the number ofm, the higher the number
of combinations and the more testing budget is required to increase
the IDC score (cf. Section 5). Investigating training-informed ways
for the automatic identification of the number of important neurons
is part of our future work.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
To ease the evaluation and adoption of DeepImportance and the
Importance-Driven Coverage from Section 3, we have implemented
a prototype tool on top of the open-source machine learning frame-
work Keras (v2.2.2) [21] with Tensorflow (v1.10.1) backend [6].
The open-source DeepImportance source code, the full exper-
imental results summarised in the following section, additional
information about DeepImportance and the case studies used for
its evaluation are available at https://deepimportance.github.io.
5 EVALUATION
5.1 Research Questions
Our experimental evaluation answers the research questions below.
RQ1 (Importance): Can neuron-importance analysis iden-
tify the most important neurons?We used this research ques-
tion to establish if the importance-based algorithm underpinning
DeepImportance for the identification of important neurons com-
fortably outperforms a strategy that selects such neurons randomly.
RQ2 (Diversity): Can DeepImportance inform the selection
of a diverse test set?We investigate whether software engineers
can employ the Importance-Driven Coverage to generate a diverse
test set that comprises semantically different test inputs.
RQ3 (Effectiveness):Howeffective isDeepImportance in iden-
tifying misbehaviours in DL systems?With this research ques-
tion, we examine the effectiveness of DeepImportance to detect
adversarial inputs carefully crafted by state-of-the-art adversar-
ial generation techniques [18, 29, 44, 57]. These adversarial inputs
should be semantically different than those encountered before,
thus increasing the Importance-Driven Coverage metric.
RQ4 (Correlation): How is DeepImportance correlated with
existing coverage criteria for DL systems?We analyse the rela-
tionship in behaviour between DeepImportance and state-of-the-art
coverage criteria for DL systems including neuron coverage [58],
k-multisection neuron coverage [50] and surprise adequacy [43].
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RQ5 (Layer Sensitivity): How is the behaviour of DeepIm-
portance affected by the selection of specific neuron layers?
Given the layer-wise capability of DeepImportance, we investigate
whether performing the analysis on shallow or deeper layers has
any impact on the Importance-Driven Coverage metric.
5.2 Experimental Setup
Datasets and DL Systems. Table 1 shows the datasets and DL
systems used in our experimental evaluation. We evaluate DeepIm-
portance on three popular publicly-available datasets. MNIST [45]
is a handwritten digit dataset with 60,000 training inputs and 10,000
testing inputs; each input is a 28x28 pixel image with a class label
from 0 to 9. CIFAR-10 [1] is an image dataset with 50,000 training
inputs and 10,000 testing inputs; each input is a 32x32 image in
ten different classes (e.g., dog, bird, car). The Udacity self-driving
car challenge dataset [2] comprises images captured by a camera
mounted behind the windshield of a moving car and supported
by the steering wheel angle applied by the human driver for each
image. Since this is the ground truth, the aim for a DL system is
to predict the steering wheel angle; hence, the DL system’s accu-
racy is measured using Mean Squared Error (MSE) between ground
truth and predicted steering angles. The Udacity dataset has 101,396
training and 5,614 testing inputs.
To enable a systematic and comprehensive assessment of Deep-
Importance, we chose DL systems used in related research [43, 50,
58, 74] with different architecture (i.e., number of layers and layer
types - fully-connected, convolutional, dropout, max- pooling), com-
plexity (i.e., number of trainable parameters) and performance. For
MNIST, we study three DL systems from the Le-Net family [45], i.e.,
LeNet-1, LeNet-4 and LeNet-5, trained to achieve over 98% accuracy
on the provided test set (cf. Table 1). For CIFAR-10, we employ the
prototype model in [1] which is a 20 layer convolutional neural
network (CNN) trained to achieve 77.68% accuracy. For the Udac-
ity self-driving car challenge, we used the pre-trained Dave-2 [13]
self-driving car DL system from Nvidia. Dave-2 comprises nine
layers including five convolutional layers and its MSE is 0.096. All
experiments were run on an Ubuntu server with 16 GB memory
and Intel Xeon E5-2698 2.20GHz.
Table 1: Datasets and DL Systems used in our experiments.
Dataset DL System # Params Performance
MNIST [45]
LeNet-1 7206 98.33%
LeNet-4 69362 98.59%
LeNet-5 107786 98.96%
CIFAR-10 [1]
A 20 layer ConvNet
with max-pooling
and dropout layers.
952234 77.68%
Udacity self-driving
car challenge[2]
Dave-2 archite-
cture from Nvidia
2116983 0.096
(MSE)
The column ‘Params’ shows the number of trainable parameters for each
DL model. The column ‘Performance’ shows the accuracy (for for MNIST
and CIFAR-10 datasets) and mean squared error (for the Udacity dataset).
Coverage Criteria Configurations.We facilitate a thorough and
unbiased evaluation of DeepImportance by comparing it against
state-of-the-art coverage criteria for DL systems. To this end, we
used DeepXplore’s [58] neuron coverage (NC); DeepGauge’s [50]
k-multisection neuron coverage (KMNC), neuron boundary cover-
age (NBC), strong neuron activation coverage (SNAC) and top-k
neuron coverage (TKNC); and Surprise’s Adequacy [43] distance-
based (DSC) and likelihood-based surprise coverage (LSC). For each
criterion, we use the hyper-parameters recommended in its original
research. In particular, we set neuron activation threshold to 0.75
in NC, and k = 3 and k = 1000 in TKNC and KMNC, respectively.
For NBC and SNAC we set as lower (upper) bound the minimum
(maximum) activation value encountered in the training set. The
upper bound for DSC and LSC is fixed to 2 and 2000, respectively,
and the number of buckets is set to 1000. Concerning DeepImpor-
tance, unless otherwise stated (e.g., RQ5), we always consider the
penultimate layer as the subject layer and the number of important
neurons m ∈ {6, 8, 10, 12}. When running the experiments, we
set an upper bound of execution time to three hours. If a criterion
exceeds this threshold, we terminate its execution and report that
no results have been generated. We facilitate the replication of
our findings by making available the implementation of all those
metrics on the project webpage.
Synthetic Inputs and Adversarial Examples.We use both syn-
thetic inputs and adversarial examples to evaluate DeepImpor-
tance. Synthetic inputs are obtained by applying small perturba-
tions on the original inputs through Gaussian-like injected white
noise [9, 10]. Adversarial examples are carefully crafted perturba-
tions to inputs, which albeit being imperceptible to the human,
lead a DL system to make an incorrect decision [29]. Adversarial
examples are typically used to assess the robustness of DL sys-
tems. We employ four widely studied attack strategies to evaluate
DeepImportance Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [29], Basic
Iterative Method (BIM) [44], Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack
(JSMA) [57], and Carlini&Wagner (C&W) [19]. Our implementation
of these strategies is based on Cleverhans [56], a Python library for
benchmarking DL systems against adversarial examples.
5.3 Results and Discussion
RQ1 (Importance). Since identifying the most important neurons
within a subject layer is a key principle of DeepImportance, we
assess if the neurons identified during neuron-importance analysis
(cf. Algorithm 1) have indeed a significant role in decision-making.
To answer this research question, we employ DeepImportance to
find them = 6 andm = 8 most important neurons for the MNIST
and Cifar-10, and Udacity datasets, respectively. We select an equiv-
alent number of neurons using a random-selection strategy. Next,
we employed the approach from [11], used in the explainable AI
area to highlight input parts responsible for a decision, and chose
inputs (pixels) whose score is above the 90th percentile (i.e., among
the top 10%). We then perturbed those pixels, setting their value
to zero if their score is above a predefined threshold of 0.5 (i.e.,
they are relevant) and to one otherwise. We limit the magnitude of
perturbation to at most 10% of the total number of pixels, aiming to
keep the perturbed input close to the original. Finally, we measured
the L2 (Euclidean) distance between the activation values of the
ICSE ’20, May 23–29, 2020, Seoul, South Korea Simos Gerasimou, Hasan Ferit Eniser, Alper Sen, and Alper Cakan
Table 2: Average (std dev.) L2 distance of activation values
for neurons selected randomly and using DeepImportance
on MNIST (LeNet-1|4|5), Cifar-10 and Udacity (Dave-2).
Strategy LeNet-1 LeNet-4 LeNet-5 Cifar-10 Dave-2
Random 0.07(±0.05) 1.09(±0.49) 0.93 (±0.51) 47.22(±42.8) 1.16(±0.75)
DeepImportance 0.28(±0.13) 4.79(±1.35) 4.18(±1.61) 112.03(±70.3) 2.83(±1.92)
Figure 4: Boxplots comparing activation values distance of
important and randomly-selected neurons between original
inputs and those with their most relevant pixels perturbed.
original input and the perturbed input both for DeepImportance
and random; a higher distance signifies a more significant change.
Figure 4 and Table 2 show boxplots and the average delta (stan-
dard deviation in parenthesis) of activation values for the entire
testing set (i.e., for all classes) of each dataset, respectively. The
reported results are over five independent runs, thus mitigating the
risk that they have been obtained by chance. Clearly, the activation
values distance for neurons selected by DeepImportance is higher
than the equivalent distance for randomly-selected neurons. The
difference becomes more evident in LeNet-4 and LeNet-5 that have
120 and 84 neurons in the penultimate layer, respectively, with the
distance using DeepImportance exceeding 4.18, whereas the dis-
tance using random is between 0.93 and 1.09. Similar observations
hold for Cifar-10 (128 feature maps), while the difference is less
clear for LeNet-1 (12 feature maps). These observations also provide
a useful indication for the number of important neuronsm with
regards to the total number of neurons in the subject layer.
We conclude that DeepImportance can detect the most
important neurons of a DL system and those neurons are
more sensitive to changes in relevant pixels of a given input.
RQ2 (Diversity). A useful coverage criterion for DL systems en-
tails the ability to assign higher coverage for test sets that comprise
semantically diverse test inputs [76]. This is a significant asset for
evaluating the ability of a DL system to learn semantically mean-
ingful features for the decision-making task rather than memoising
or learning irrelevant features (i.e., learn to make decisions by ex-
ploiting unintended similarity patterns in the test set) [8].
To answer this research question, wemeasured the IDCmetric (6)
given the original test setUO of each dataset and corresponding DL
systems (cf. Section 5.2) for multiple values of important neurons
m ∈ {6, 8, 10, 12}. Then, for each test set we created two ‘perturbed’
versions. The former is a semantically diverse setUDI that consists
of inputs whose top 2% pixels (identified similarly as in RQ1), are
perturbed by applying small perturbations to the original inputs
through Gaussian white noise [9, 10]. The number of perturbed
pixels are 15 for MNIST, 20 for Cifar-10 and 200 for Udacity. The
other is a numerically diverse setUS that consists of synthetic inputs
generated also by injecting Gaussian white noise to an equivalent
number of randomly-selected pixels of original inputs. For example,
Fig. 5 shows an original input from the Udacity dataset (left), the
perturbed input from the US set (centre) and the perturbed input
within theUDI set (right). The modified pixels in the image on the
right are the top 2% pixels that lead the car to steer the wheel to
the left (ground truth). We add both of these perturbed test sets
to the original set and obtain the test sets UO+DI and UO+S and
measured their IDC metric.
Table 3 (top rows with IDC prefix) shows the average IDC value
for different DL systems and number of important neuronsm. As
before, we reduce randomisation bias by reporting results over
five independent runs. For all datasets and DL systems, the IDC
value for the semantically diverse set (column UO+DI ) is always
higher than that for the numerically diverse set (UO+S column).
In fact, the difference becomes more clear for the more complex
DL systems, e.g., LeNet-4 (+1% on average) and Dave-2 (+1.5% on
average). This behaviour is also reinforced by a corresponding
reduction in accuracy. In particular, in all instances the prediction
confidence for theUO+S set is always higher than that of theUO+DI
set. These observations signify that IDC is more sensitive to input
features that are important to the decision-making task instead of
randomly-selected features.
Another interesting observation from Table 3 is that due to the
INCC number (5), the IDC value becomes lower as the number of
important neuronsm increases. Considering LeNet-4, for instance,
IDC decreases from 65.8% (64.2%) to 18.1%(16.9%) forUO+DI (UO+S )
when m = 6 and m = 10, respectively. For these experiments,
the number of clusters of important neurons extracted from Al-
gorithm 2 is between two and four. This is expected since the
combinations of important neurons clusters (INCC) increases expo-
nentially asm increases (e.g., [64, 486] form = 6 and [4096, 69984]
form = 12). Software engineers can use this information to adjust
the available budget and effort needed to test their DL systems.
For completeness, we ran similar experiments using state-of-
the-art coverage criteria for DL systems (cf. Section 5.2). Table 3
(bottom) shows their coverage results. Except from LeNet-1, i.e.,
the DL system with the smallest complexity, the coverage results
for all other DL systems are smaller for the semantically diverse set
UDI compared to the numerically diverse setUS . In contrast to IDC,
which is sensitive to perturbations to relevant input features, these
criteria are also sensitive to perturbations to random input features.
We conclude that DeepImportance with its IDC coverage
criterion can support software engineers to create a diverse
test set that comprises semantically different test inputs.
RQ3 (Effectiveness). Building on research in traditional software
testing, effective coverage criteria for DL systems should be capable
of identifying misbehaviours (i.e., failing test cases) [35]. Coverage
criteria satisfying this property have good fault-detection abilities.
Thus, they can be used to evaluate the adequacy of a test set and
provide a quantifiable measurement of confidence in testing [59].
To assess the effectiveness of DeepImportance, we compared the
IDC values between an unmodified test set UO and sets enhanced
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Table 3: Average (std dev) coverage results for Importance-DrivenCoverage criterion (m ∈ {6,8,10,12}) and other coverage criteria
forMNIST,Cifar-10 andUdacity datasets; the highest value betweenUS andUDI is boldfaced (T/O: timeout, N/A: not applicable).
LeNet-1 (MNIST) LeNet-4 (MNIST) LeNet-5 (MNIST) Cifar-10 Dave-2 (Udacity)
UO UO+S UO+DI UO UO+S UO+DI UO UO+S UO+DI UO UO+S UO+DI UO UO+S UO+DI
IDC6 34.6%(±2.2) 38.0%(±2.5) 38.8%(±2.4) 58.8%(±2.7) 64.2%(±2.7) 65.8%(±2.7) 47.0%(±3.0) 51.1%(±2.9) 52.1%(±2.8) 29.4%(±1.3) 37.9%(±1.5) 39.0%(±1.4) 19.1%(±0.7) 26.0%(±1.1) 28.5%(±1.1)
IDC8 14.1%(±0.9) 16.5%(±1.1) 17.5%(±1.2) 26.9%(±1.1) 31.8%(±1.4) 32.9%(±1.5) 28.0%(±1.2) 33.7%(±1.7) 34.5%(±1.7) 11.1%(±0.6) 15.5%(±0.8) 16.6%(±0.9) 7.8%(±0.3) 10.0%(±0.5) 11.6%(±0.2)
IDC10 5.5%(±0.3) 6.6%(±0.4) 7.0%(±0.4) 13.5%(±0.8) 16.9%(±1.0) 18.1%(±1.0) 9.5%(±0.4) 12.2%(±0.5) 13.1%(±0.6) 5.1%(±0.3) 7.4%(±0.4) 8.1%(±0.4) 3.3%(±0) 4.2%(±0.1) 4.9%(±0.2)
IDC12 2.1%(±0.1) 2.6%(±0.1) 2.9%(±0.2) 4.5%(±0.2) 6.3%(±0.3) 6.9%(±0.4) 4.4%(±0.2) 6.2%(±0.4) 6.8%(±0.4) 2.0%(±0.2) 3.2%(±0.3) 3.7%(±0.3) 1.4%(±0) 2.0%(±0) 2.3%(±0)
NC 17.3%(±0.5) 20.7%(±0.3) 20.5%(±0.3) 37.9%(±0.7) 44.1%(±0.8) 43.4%(±0.8) 44.2%(±0.9) 51.7%(±0.9) 50.6%(±0.9) 20.2%(±0.3) 35.2%(±0.2) 34.5%(±0.2) 51.6%(±1.8) 66.7%(±0.2) 64.7%(±0.3)
KMNC 35.1%(±0.3) 51.3%(±0.4) 48.2%(±0.4) 34.9%(±0.2) 54.4%(±0.3) 50.8%(±0.3) 32.5%(±0.2) 52.0%(±0.3) 48.4%(±0.2) 36.8%(±0) 43.5%(±0) 41.5%(±0) 30.2%(±0) 50.9%(±0.1) 46.6%(±0.1)
NBC 16.7%(±1.3) 22.5%(±1.4) 21.5%(±1.3) 9.3%(±0.6) 12.3%(±0.6) 11.7%(±0.6) 9.3%(±0.5) 12.1%(±0.6) 11.5%(±0.5) 9.4%(±0) 9.5%(±0) 9.5%(±0) 0.8%(±0.1) 24.7%(±0.5) 21.4%(±0.7)
SNAC 10.9%(±0.6) 14.6%(±0.6) 13.8%(±0.6) 12.0%(±0.5) 15.0%(±0.6) 14.3%(±0.6) 14.4%(±0.5) 18.1%(±0.6) 17.3%(±0.6) 8.8%(±0) 8.9%(±0) 8.9%(±0) 1.5%(±0.2) 46.9%(±0.9) 41.0%(±1.4)
TKNC 100.0%(±0.0) 100.0%(±0.0) 100.0%(±0.0) 91.3%(±0.0) 91.7%(±0.2) 91.6%(±0.2) 88.8%(±0.0) 89.2%(±0.0) 89.1%(±0.1) 15.2%(±0.0) 17.0%(±0.1) 16.6%(±0.1) 40.8%(±0.1) 52.1%(±0.2) 50.0%(±0.2)
DSC 86.3%(±0.0) 91.7%(±0.3) 92.3%(±0.5) 60.2%(±0.3) 66.8%(±0.1) 66.7%(±0.2) 54.9%(±0.0) 60.9%(±0.2) 61.4%(±0.2) TO TO TO N/A N/A N/A
LSC 2.8%(±0.1) 3.3%(±0.1) 3.2% (±0.1) 14.6%(±0.1) 16.7%(±0.1) 16.5%(±0.2) % 13.8(±0.0) 16.5%(±0.1) 16.8%(±0.2) TO TO TO 4.2%(±0.1) 4.6%(±0.1) 4.7%(±0.1)
Figure 5: Example image from the Udacity dataset showing
the original input (left), an input from theUS set with Gauss-
ian noise in random pixels (centre), and an input from the
UDI set with Gaussian noise to relevant pixels (right).
with perturbed inputs using white noise and adversarial inputs
carefully crafted using state-of-the-art adversarial generation tech-
niques. More specifically, for each dataset and each DL system,
we generated four adversarial test sets using FGSM [29], BIM [44],
JSMA [57] and CW [18] and another numerically diverse test US
via Gaussian white noise with standard deviation=0.3 (as in RQ1).
Unlike adversarial inputs, the set US is correctly classified with
accuracy 97.4% on average. We extended the original set with each
of these synthesised test sets and measured their IDC values for
the corresponding DL systems.
Table 4 (columns IDC6 and IDC8) shows the average IDC cov-
erage results for m ∈ {6, 8} across the six enhanced test sets of
each DL system. Compared to the original test set UO , there is a
considerable increase in the IDC result for the enhanced test sets
for all DL systems. As expected, the IDC result form = 6 (IDC6)
is higher than that for m = 8 (IDC8) as the number of combina-
tions INCC (5) grows exponentially with the number of important
neurons. The increase is more significant in test sets involving ad-
versarial inputs than that with Gaussian-like noisy inputs (UO+S ) .
Consequently, adversarial inputs lead to higher coverage for our
IDC criterion, thus signifying the sensitivity to adversarial inputs
and its fault detection abilities (conforming to testing criteria in
traditional software testing).
We conclude that IDC is sensitive to adversarial inputs
and is effective in detecting misbehaviours in test sets with
inputs semantically different than those encountered before.
Table 4: Effectiveness of coverage metrics. (‘+Y’ means
adding Y-based adversarial inputs to the original test setUO )
IDC6 IDC8 NC KMNC NBC SNAC TKNC LSA DSA
UO . 34.6% 14.1% 23.8% 62.7% 15.1% 18.6% 100% 2.6% 86.2%
UO+S 36.3% 16.1% 23.8% 70.8% 25.0% 18.6% 100% 4.0% 87.6%
+FGSM 42.3% 20.9% 23.8% 81.1% 46.5% 55.8% 100% 13.7% 85.3%
+BIM 43.2% 20.8% 23.8% 71.6% 45.3% 53.4% 100% 9.6% 86.8%
+JSMA 41.0% 19.0% 23.8% 80.5% 31.3% 37.2% 100% 13.9% 86.9%
Le
N
et
-1
+CW 37.9% 17.0% 23.8% 64.9% 16.6% 19.0% 100% 5.2% 86.2%
UO . 58.8% 27.0% 63.7% 69.2% 7.9% 12.3% 91.3% 14.4% 61.5%
UO+S 62.0% 29.1% 64.4% 72.6% 10.8% 12.3% 91.3% 10.9% 67.0%
+FGSM 65.6% 33.4% 64.4% 79.4% 38.8 % 65.4% 93.4% 39.3% 83.7%
+BIM 66.5% 33.4% 79.3% 74.2% 41.0% 69.7% 92.7% 45.1% 78.8%
+JSMA 64.7% 32.2% 63.7% 76.8% 14.3% 20.8% 91.3% 64.4% 88.8%
Le
N
et
-4
+CW 62.8% 31.0% 63.7% 70.5% 7.9% 12.3% 91.3% 14.4% 60.1
UO . 47.0% 28.0% 75.3% 69.2% 7.6% 13.8% 88.8% 13.8% 54.9%
UO+S 48.1% 29.1% 75.3% 71.5% 10.0% 13.8% 88.8% 10.8% 57.3%
+FGSM 51.6% 32.3% 75.3% 79.6% 40.7% 71.3% 89.1% 40.4% 83.5%
+BIM 51.6% 32.3% 84.7% 76.1% 46.2% 83.2% 89.1% 42.4% 74.3%
+JSMA 49.8% 32.3% 75.3% 74.3% 12.8% 21.1% 89.1% 61.0% 85.7%
Le
N
et
-5
+CW 49.8% 31.8% 75.3% 70.6% 7.6% 13.8% 88.8% 15.2% 61.2%
RQ4 (Correlation).We report results on how state-of-the-art cov-
erage criteria behave across the six tests sets for MNIST in Table 4.
Similarly to IDC, most of the criteria, i.e., KMNC, NBC, SNAC, LSA,
DSA, experience a similar increase to their coverage results when
evaluated using test sets augmented with adversarial inputs (e.g.,
FGSM, BIM, JSMA, CW). As such, IDC is consistent with criteria
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Table 5: IDC coverage results for different layers with the
best coverage between theUO andUO+DI sets typeset in bold.
LeNet1 (IDC4) LeNet4 (IDC4) LeNet5 (IDC6)
UO UO+DI UO UO+DI UO UO+DI
Conv1 35.3% 38.3% 33.9% 35.9% 12.5% 15.6%
Conv2 76.2% 80.8% 81.6% 84.0% 31.0% 36.6%
FC1 - - 86.0% 90.0% 37.0% 44.2%
FC2 - - - - 35.8% 43.4%
Conv*: Convolutional layer; FC*: Fully-connected layer
LeNet-4 has only one FC layer; LeNet-1 has none.
based on input surprise (e.g., LSA, DSA) and aggregation of neuron
property values (e.g., KMNC, NC). However, while the IDC result
for the test set UO+S is always lower than that with adversarial
inputs (with the exception of BIM for IDC8 on LeNet-4), there are
several instances in whichUO+S produces higher results than the
adversarial-augmented sets (e.g., KMNC, NBC DSA for LeNet-1).
This is an interesting finding that requires further investigation.
Another interesting observation is that NC and TKNC are in-
sensitive to either Gaussian-like noisy inputs or adversarial inputs,
irrespective of the employed adversarial technique. The results for
NC are not surprising and conform to results reported in existing
research [43, 50]. Nevertheless, the plateau shown in TKNC is par-
ticularly important since it is a layer-wise coverage criterion, like
IDC. In contrast to IDC, TKNC measures how many neurons have
at least once been the most active k neurons on a target (or all) layer.
Considering these results, IDC is more informative than TKNC.
In general, we conclude that IDC shows a similar behaviour
to state-of-the-art coverage criteria for DL systems; hence,
there is a positive correlation between them.
RQ5 (Layer Sensitivity). Since DeepImportance operates layer-
wise, we investigated how IDC varies for different layers of a DL
system. Table 5 shows the coverage results form ∈ {4, 6} across
layers, ordered by their depth for the three DL systems, using the
original test set UO and that augmented with semantically diverse
inputs UO+DI . First, we observe that IDC value increases when
the analysis is performed on deeper instead of shallow layers. For
instance, in LeNet-4 and theUO test set, IDC increases from 33.9% in
Conv1 to 81.6% in Conv2 until it reaches 86.0% in FC1. We consider
this observation as a confirmation of the ability of DL systems to
extract more meaningful features in deeper layers.
Furthermore, IDC is more sensitive to the test set with seman-
tically diverse inputs (UO+DI ). In fact, we can observe a steady
increase in the delta in IDC values between UO+ID and UO for
more deeper layers. For Lenet-5, for instance, the IDC delta grows
from 3.1% in Conv1 to 5.6% and 7.2% in Conv2 and FC1, respectively,
until it reaches 7.6% for FC2. This behaviour persists despite the
slight decrease in IDC value between FC1 and FC2 for bothUO and
UO+DI . This observation reasserts our findings in RQ2 (cf. Table 3).
Overall, the chosen target layer affects the result of IDC.
Since the penultimate layer is responsible to understand se-
mantically-important high-level features, we argue it is a
suitable choice to assess the adequacy of a test set using IDC.
5.4 Threats to Validity
We mitigate construct validity threats that could occur due to
simplifications in the adopted experimental methodology using
widely-studied datasets, i.e., MNIST [45], Cifar-10 [1] and Udacity
self-driving car challenge [2]. Also, we employed publicly-available
DL systems including LeNet [45] and Dave-2 [13] that have different
architectures and achieve competitive performance results [28].
Also, we mitigate threats related to the identification of important
neurons (Algorithm 1) by adapting techniques from the explainable
AI area for identifying input parts responsible for a decision [54].
We limit internal validity threats that could introduce bias
when establishing the causality between our findings and the ex-
perimental study by designing independent research questions to
evaluate DeepImportance. Hence, we illustrate the performance of
DeepImportance in RQ1 and RQ2 for different values of important
neuronsm ∈ {6, 8, 10, 12} and by augmenting the original test sets
with both numerically diverse and semantically diverse perturbed
inputs. The granularity of IDC increases exponentially with higher
m values, thus requiring a substantially larger number of inputs
to be satisfied. We also assessed the effectiveness of IDC to detect
adversarial examples and confirmed its positive correlation with
state-of-the-art coverage criteria for DL systems in RQ3 and RQ4,
respectively. Furthermore, we investigate the effect of layer selec-
tion on IDC result in a structured manner in RQ5. Finally, when
randomness can play a factor (e.g., in RQ1 and RQ2), we reduce
threats that the observations might have been obtained accidentally
by reporting results over five independent runs per experiment.
We mitigate external validity threats that could affect the gen-
eralisation of IDC by developing DeepImportance on top of the
open-source frameworks Keras and Tensorflowwhich enable white-
box DNN analysis. We further reduce the risk that DeepImportance
might be difficult to use in practice by validating it against several
DL systems trained on three popular datasets (MNIST [45], Cifar-
10 [1], Udacity [2]). However, more experiments are needed to
assess the performance of DeepImportance using other techniques
to identify the important neurons (e.g., DeepLift [65]), to extract
clusters within important neurons (e.g., hierarchical clustering) and
to validate the cohesion and separation of those clusters. These
experiments are part of our future work.
6 RELATEDWORK
Trustworthiness issues in DL systems urged researchers to develop
techniques that enable their effective and systematic testing [76].
Existing research in the area adapts testing techniques and criteria
from traditional software engineering (e.g., [24, 49, 51, 69]) while
other proposes novel test adequacy criteria [35]. For instance, Deep-
Xplore [58] introduces neuron coverage for measuring the ratio
of neurons whose activation values are above a predefined thresh-
old. Similarly, DeepGauge [50] introduces a family of adequacy
criteria based on a more detailed analysis of neuron activation val-
ues. DeepCT [49] proposes a combinatorial testing approach, while
DeepCover [68] adapts MC/DC from traditional software testing
and defines adequacy criteria that investigate the changes of succes-
sive pairs of layers. Recent research also proposes testing criteria
and techniques driven by symbolic execution [31], coverage guided
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fuzzing [55, 75] and metamorphic transformations [71], while other
research explores test prioritization [16] and fault localisation [24].
Although the objective of existing research is to guide testing
of DL systems, eventually improving their accuracy and robust-
ness, the majority concerns testing adequacy based on neuron-level
properties. In contrast, DeepImportance, driven by the fact that the
behaviour of a DL system is determined layer-wise [28], proposes
a layer-wise and importance-based test adequacy criterion. In our
experimental study (cf. Section 5), we compare the performance of
IDC against other layer-wise criteria (e.g., TKNC) and show that
IDC is more informative. The recent research on using surprise ad-
equacy to guide testing [43] is complementary to DeepImportance.
A closely-related research branch is the provision of guarantees
for the trustworthinesss of DL systems via formal verification [36].
AI2 [26] uses abstract interpretation to verify safety properties,
while [60] employs abstraction refinement. Other research uses
SMT solvers to identify safe regions in the input space and thus es-
tablish the robustness of DL systems [30, 40]. Instead of SMT solvers,
ReluVal [73] finds bounds for security properties using interval
arithmetic. Finally, DLV [74] verifies local robustness based on
user-defined manipulations. DeepImportance identifies important
neurons using techniques from the explainable AI area (e.g., [11]);
thus, it is orthogonal to existing research on DL system verification.
Test adequacy is a widely-studied topic within traditional soft-
ware engineering [59]. Interested readers can find comprehensive
reviews of relevant research in this area in related surveys and
books [7, 32, 37, 53].
7 CONCLUSION
Ensuring the trustworthiness of DL systems requires their thor-
ough and systematic testing. DeepImportance is a systematic test-
ing methodology reinforced by an Importance-Driven (IDC) test
adequacy criterion for DL systems. DeepImportance analyses the
internal neuron behaviour to create a layer-wise functional under-
standing and automatically establish a finite set of clusters that rep-
resent the behaviour of the most important neurons to an adequate
level of granularity. The Importance-Driven adequacy criterion
measures the adequacy of a test set as the ratio of combinations
of important neurons clusters covered by the set. Our experimen-
tal evaluation shows that IDC achieves higher results for test sets
with semantically-diverse inputs. IDC is also sensitive to adversarial
inputs and, thus, effective in detecting misbehaviour in test sets.
Our future work involves (1) investigating methods to automati-
cally determine the number of important neurons; (2) improving
the robustness of IDC; (3) evaluating DeepImportance on other
DL systems and datasets; and (4) examining how DeepImportance
results can be incorporated into safety cases [17, 42].
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